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Abstract:  
Without denying the potential for publically-funded redistribution, as is done by market-
advocates, we must acknowledge that the existing international aid architecture has 
largely failed in its purpose of inducing any significant degree of wealth redistribution 
between North and South, except in certain geopolitical special cases. Moreover, the 
fundamental reasons for this failure will most likely extend to current considerations of 
Finance for Climate Change. This failure is examined here through the lens of 
understanding Official Development Assistance as a financial flow within the context of 
global financial imbalances in the post-war period, as a means to reflect more broadly on 
recent debates regarding aid effectiveness in developing economies. The central focus of 
this conceptual examination is on what might be called the dilemma of monetary 
transformation in the transfer of foreign to domestic resources. This dilemma is 
poignantly illustrated by the dominant (albeit usually misconstrued) emphasis in the 
contemporary aid literature on the need and potential of aid to finance social expenditures 
in the Global South, such as on health and education spending or cash transfers. From the 
perspective of the monetary dilemma posed here, such emphasis ironically results in 
increased impulses among donors to meddle by way of conditionalities in the sovereign 
space of domestic political deliberations in recipient countries regarding the uses of 
government expenditure.  
 
 
Extended Draft Abstract / Synopsis:  
Without denying the potential for publically-funded redistribution, as is done by market-
advocates such as Bill Easterly or Dambisa Moyo, we must acknowledge that the existing 
international aid architecture has failed in its purpose of inducing any significant degree 
of wealth redistribution between North and South, except in certain geopolitical special 
cases. Moreover, the fundamental reasons for this failure will most likely extend to 
current considerations of Finance for Climate Change. This failure is here examined 
through the lens of understanding Official Development Assistance as a financial flow 
within the context of global financial imbalances in the post-war period, as a means to 
reflect more broadly on recent debates regarding aid effectiveness in developing 
economies. The central focus of this conceptual examination is on what might be called 
the dilemma of monetary transformation in the transfer of foreign to domestic resources. 
This dilemma is poignantly illustrated by the dominant (albeit usually misconstrued) 
emphasis in the contemporary aid literature on the need and potential of aid to finance 
social expenditures in the Global South, such as on health and education spending or cash 
transfers. From a monetary perspective, such emphasis ironically results in increased 
impulses among donors to meddle by way of conditionalities in the sovereign space of 
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domestic political deliberations in recipient countries regarding the uses of government 
expenditure. This argument is elaborated in three sections. 
The first section starts with the basic premise – as outlined in Fischer (2009), 
‘Putting Aid in its Place’ (J. of International Development) – that aid effectiveness needs 
to be understood (and was understood by early development economists) by its potential 
to allow countries to run trade deficits (and, by consequence, net capital inflows). Since 
trade deficits usually result as a structural condition of late industrialisation, especially 
among post-war ‘late-late’ industrialisers, aid can prevent such deficits from choking off 
intensive developmental endeavours. Conversely, this potential of aid is lost if countries 
run trade surpluses (or else if deficits are not the result of developmental productivity 
enhancing investments, but rather, due to terms of trade or other negative shocks).  
Using balance of payments and flow of funds data, the second section of the paper 
elaborates on the two paradigmatic phases of the post-war period, driven by imbalances 
stemming from the US, the gravitational centre of the international financial system. 
These two phases can be called, for lack of better terms, ‘developmentalist’ and 
‘neoliberal’. The first was the golden age of developmentalism and aid; up to the mid-
1970s, the US was mostly in current account surplus and exporting net goods and finance 
abroad, thereby supplying and financing the trade deficits of first Europe and then 
developing countries undergoing intensive rebuilding and/or industrialisation efforts. In 
this context, aid was one among other forms of net capital outflow from the US 
supporting industrialisation, as best represented by the case of South Korea. However, 
this phase was also the age of dependency given that it represented the rapid expansion of 
US-based transnational corporations (TNCs) into the Global South through the vehicle of 
foreign direct investment (FDI), one of the main sources of capital export. This was 
classically depicted by the experience of Latin America – particularly by Brazil and the 
Southern Cone countries, which were the most industrially advanced in this region. 
Hence, the dialectic in this period – or the tension reflected by the imbalances – was 
between developmentalism and dependency, which in turn defined the theoretical terrain 
of development studies and the debates regarding aid in this earlier period. International 
financial liberalisation from the mid-1960s onwards extended the contradictions of this 
dialectic into the 1970s, allowing for faltering developmentalist attempts to counteract the 
constraints of dependency.  
In the second phase, which started in late 1970s, the US moved into a position of 
persistently large and growing current account deficits, therefore absorbing finance from 
rest of the world, albeit alongside continued waves of financial liberalisation in the US 
and globally. Moreover, despite the overall net import of finance by the US economy 
from the rest of the world, the US economy has nonetheless continued to export net FDI, 
reflecting the continued expansion of the US corporate sector abroad (and the corporate 
sectors of other lead countries, e.g. the pattern is essentially the same for the UK; the 
pattern is different for Germany, in that German corporate expansion has taken place in 
the midst of current account surpluses).  
Hence, the dialectical tension in this latter phase has shifted. On one hand, there 
has been a continued progression of Northern-centred transnational ownership and related 
international production networks, which has supported in the exceptional growth of a 
handful of developing countries such as China (albeit with exceptional characteristics 
dissimilar to most earlier post-war industrialisers, such as large trade surpluses, alongside 
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the maintenance of a strongly developmentalist strategy). On the other hand, for most of 
this latter period (up until the recent commodity booms), most of the rest of developing 
countries have faced deficient demand and investment and anaemic growth due to 
stringent macroeconomic policy regimes and haemorrhages of wealth from their 
economies. The prospects for aid effectiveness in this latter phase have been far from 
evident given that the dominant trend in global financial flows has been regressive, as 
analysed in the paper through an historical trend analysis of the balance of payments of a 
collection of aid dependent countries in Africa, Asia and Latin America. In other words, 
aid flows have essentially been moving against a tidal wave of global financial 
imbalances. This perspective – as well as the distinction between two paradigmatic 
phases – is usually ignored by the prominent critics of aid, such as Easterly and Moyo.  
The third section of the paper then frames current debates regarding aid 
effectiveness in light of the above analysis, with particular focus on issues related to the 
targeting of aid towards social spending, tied aid, institutional conditionalities (including 
recent ‘cash on demand’ proposals), and public debt financing. Notably, aid essentially 
represents transfers of foreign exchange. Insofar as these are not directly intended for 
financing imports or other foreign exchange needs (as would be suggested by using aid to 
finance trade deficits), then aid is effectively entirely fungible, almost by definition. In 
terms of the financial circuit, aid provisioning intended for domestic expenditure in 
domestic currency essentially amounts to a government printing money, albeit backed up 
by foreign exchange. The printed money is used for the said purpose (social or productive 
spending in domestic currency), while the foreign exchange provided is used for some 
other purpose related to the use of foreign exchange (purchase of imported goods or 
services, debt servicing, etc).  
In this sense, the aid question is rooted in a problem of monetary transformation. 
When donors insist that aid should be spent on social spending, in reality, most social 
spending takes place in domestic currency (e.g. salaries). Hence, donors possess no direct 
control over aid money being allocated to these sectors except by way of conditionalities 
linked to these domestic expenditures (or else by way of donors directly controlling the 
domestic currency that they receive in exchange for the foreign exchange they provide, as 
is typical in the INGO sector and in some bilateral aid projects, although such direct 
project work has come under increasing criticism). Effectively, the actual aid money (i.e. 
the foreign exchange provided) never goes to those social sectors unless it is spent on 
foreign technical assistance (e.g. doctors and consultants) or imports (e.g. MRI 
machines). In consequence, insistence that foreign aid be used for domestic expenditures 
in domestic currency contributes to the impulses of donors to increasingly meddle into 
the domestic political deliberations of recipient countries through conditionalities and 
other mechanisms. Such meddling amounts to very round-about ways of committing an 
aid-recipient government to direct a certain proportion of its domestic expenditure into 
such uses (with domestic currency, which it rightly prints as a sovereign nation), thereby 
symbolically legitimising the use of the aid money to the donor. Recent proposals for a 
‘cash-on-demand’ aid model can be seen as merely a new (and potentially very powerful) 
means of enforcing such donor impulses.  
In a monetary sense, such meddling involves an encroachment on national 
sovereignty, insofar as it extends far beyond the issue of deficiencies in (foreign) savings 
and into domestic political deliberations. This insight is similar to common criticisms of 
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the so called Post Washington Consensus and Good Governance approaches, whereby we 
have been seeing the proliferation of conditionalities extending beyond the traditional 
economic policy concerns of the Washington Consensus and into the realm of the 
political. These criticisms are clarified here from the perspective of international finance, 
whereby governments become increasingly bound by foreign and increasingly 
technocratic demands in terms of how they should be deliberating and conducting their 
own domestic expenditure, while the actual management of foreign exchange has become 
increasingly deregulated, liberalised and even denationalised (and aid simply contributing 
to that pool of foreign exchange).  
The contention of this paper is that the aid question can only be resolved through 
a revival of the older developmentalist understanding of aid, which is largely ignored in 
current aid effectiveness debates (even by the pro-aid camp, which is dominated by 
regressional analyses that are poorly suited to catch these historical and structural 
dynamics). Indeed, this financial lens also helps to clarify some of the criticisms of tied 
aid, which have tended to demonise the idea of aid being spent on imports (physical, 
human, etc). In effect, aid money (as foreign exchange) can be directly used for nothing 
else other than imports and other foreign exchange needs (such as debt repayment). The 
fundamental problem with tied aid is not that aid is spent on imports, but that it locks 
countries into certain structural dependencies on donor countries, resulting in very little 
autonomy for receiving countries in deciding how to use the foreign exchange provided 
in a manner most suitable and effective for their local economy, as opposed to the 
economy of the donor country. Stipulations for international tendering and the high 
degree of contextual institutional competency required by many formally-untied aid 
programmes also effectively result in the tying of aid as an outcome. In contrast, 
successful cases of aid utilisation in the past (e.g. South Korea) were characterised by 
autonomy and effective national ownership in this regard (obviously permitted due to 
geopolitical circumstances), among other determining factors. Similarly, this financial 
lens redeems the use of concessional public debt financing for developing countries. 
Despite the demonization of debt financing by poor countries for much of the last thirty 
years and the associated celebration for FDI as a stable alternative, debt financing, as 
once pointed out by Arthur Lewis, remains the primary financing option that preserves 
autonomy and sovereignty so long as it remains manageable. Manageability depends in 
part on the productive investment of debt but also, perhaps more crucially, on the broader 
structuring of global imbalances, insofar as these should support net inflows to, rather 
than net outflows from, developing countries. 
The paper concludes that the key to creating a truly effective aid system – or 
climate change financing mechanism for that matter – must be found in genuinely 
redistributive financing mechanisms that enhance rather than undermine national self-
determination.  
 
 
 
